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OPNAVINST 55513.4D

MAY 25 1994

01. IDENTIFYING DATA:

ID: 04D-04

CL: U

SU: INTELLIGENCE, GENERAL NAVAL

OC: CNO (N2)

CA: CNO (N2)

OD: 74-10-03

CD: 94-05-15

RD: 96-05-15

02. THREAT/BACKGROUND: Potential adversaries are continuously striving to develop methods of weakening or neutralizing the Navy's role in the defense of the United States. The Navy must be aware of these methods to ensure means are developed to negate their effectiveness.

03. MISSION: The mission of Naval Intelligence is to implement the Chief of Naval Operation's (CNO) responsibilities for intelligence, cryptology (less signals security), special security, and counterintelligence; to serve as the principal staff advisor to the CNO and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) in intelligence related plans, programming and policy matters; to represent the Department of the Navy (DON) on the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), National Intelligence Council and with other agencies in intelligence matters; and to advise and assist DON officials in matters of protocol and liaison with foreign officials.

04. FINANCIAL: In general, resource information should not be classified unless it reveals some aspect of the intelligence mission the revelation of which would jeopardize the effectiveness of a particular function. However, all resource information should be handled as FOUO at a minimum until submitted to Congress.

05. MILESTONE: There are no specific milestones addressed in this general guide.

06. DESIGN PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS:

A. Foreign weapon systems. In the absence of any specific

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classification guidance, the following general guidance applies:

- (1) If we don't know anything (except the mere existence) about a foreign nation's weapon system or specific military capability: TS-OADR
- (2) If we don't know anything about a component of a foreign nation's weapon system: S-OADR
- (3) If we have limited knowledge concerning a foreign nation's weapon system or specific military capability: S-OADR
- (4) If we have complete knowledge concerning a foreign nation's major weapon system or specific military capability: C-OADR
- (5) If we have limited or complete knowledge concerning a component of a foreign nation's major weapon system: C-OADR

07. OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL

A. DON sensitive sources or methods information. DON intelligence information received from sensitive sources or via sensitive methods under the cognizance of the Navy will normally be classified as follows:

- (1) If the document containing the information identifies the sensitive source or method, either by name or other means, the document should be classified secret and marked "Warning Notice - Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved", to be declassified upon determination of the originating agency (OADR).
- (2) If the document does not identify the sensitive source or method, by name or other means, (less source or method registry number which normally is unclassified), the classification should be based solely on the sensitivity of the information as prescribed by other topics of this guide or subsequent directives. Exceptions to the foregoing will be specifically noted in the individual program document which provides specific classification guidance.

B. DON conventional source or method information. The identity of an overt source or method normally does not require security protection. If the military intelligence is communicated to the DON by a foreign government pursuant to a government-to-government agreement, it must be protected at the level and for the length of time the transmitting government desires. Also, if the information is obtained from a conventional method or source and the information is provided freely without any restriction, the classification should be based solely on the sensitivity of the information as prescribed by other topics of this guide.

C. Non-DON conventional and sensitive source and method information. The classification assigned to information received from non-DON sources, sensitive or conventional, must be respected by DON users unless permission to downgrade has been specifically authorized by the non-DON source. Security classifications which

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appear to be inconsistent with this guide should be challenged in an effort to produce properly classified DON intelligence publications.

D. Evaluations of intelligence received from sensitive and conventional sources or methods. Heretofore, this guide has been mainly concerned with raw data or information which has not been evaluated. Evaluations can be of the source or method itself, or the information received from the source or method. Evaluations should be classified derivatively from the source or method, as prescribed by other topics of this guide, if source identity or the raw data are included in the evaluation. If such is not included, the evaluation should be classified on its own merit pursuant to other topics of this guide.

E. Production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other estimates and threat documents. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) obtains all-source information, both raw and evaluated and uses this information to prepare joint, national and naval estimates and other "threat support" documents. Simply, past and present intelligence is used to estimate what the threat is now and will be in future years, in order to develop methods to counter these developing threats. ONI also prepares foreign force structure projections, including hardware, personnel and intent. Estimates should be classified derivatively, based on the source information only if the estimate itself reveals the raw or evaluated intelligence. Otherwise, they should be classified on their own merit under other topics of this guide.

(1) National Intelligence Estimates. The Regional Analysis Division (ONI-223), under the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), is the primary agent and the central point of contact for ONI in the NIE process. ONI-223 represents the command-wide input at NIE coordination meetings and prepares the necessary background support and documentation for the DNI in the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) and NFIB NIEs are classified by the National Intelligence Council.

(2) Other estimates and threat documents. ONI produces a wide range of other estimates and threat documents that are used as the "Threat Basis" for future military systems requirements, including DON systems. ONI's "Worldwide Threat to Navy and Maritime forces, 1993-2013" is a prominent example. ONI also provides across-the-board expertise in wargames and represents the Navy's interests in a wide range of OSD, JCS and other national level arenas.

F. Intelligence Collection Requirements. These requirements reveal what we don't know about a particular enemy, or what we need to know, and sometimes why we need to know. The requirement may recommend a sensitive source or method as a possible source of the information; if so, the minimum classification require-

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ments contained in 07A would be applicable. The requirements may contain technical, functional, and operational characteristics of DON weapons systems. If so, the classification guidance published per OPNAVINST 5513.1D should be utilized. If neither of those two types of information is contained in the requirements, then the classification is based on the description of the military intelligence required under other topics of this guide.

08. HARDWARE: The classification of the hardware itself will be at the same level as the fact that we have such hardware in our possession.

09. COMPUTER RESOURCES: Not applicable.

10. OTHER:

A. Liaison relationship with foreign intelligence organizations and foreign security sources:

(1) The fact of broad, general intelligence cooperation with countries or groups of countries with which the United States maintains formal military alliances or agreements (e.g., NATO): U

(2) The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and a specific governmental component in an allied country, or general description of the nature of intelligence cooperation between the United States and one of the foregoing parties is classified Confidential unless another classification level is specified by mutual agreement with the government or organization concerned.

(3) The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and specifically named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the United States is not allied is classified Secret unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon.

(4) Details of or specifics concerning any intelligence liaison or exchange agreement will be classified per the content.

(5) The identities (including name or title) of foreign governmental or military personnel who provide relationships will be protected at the same level of classification which applies to the fact of the intelligence cooperation, or at such different level as may be mutually agreed upon.

(6) Information classified under paragraphs 10A(2)-(5) will not be released to any component of either a foreign government or an international organization without the mutual agreement of the originating parties.

(7) Information classified under this guidance will be protected as specified in applicable executive order and may be declassified only consistent with the mutual desires of the United States and the foreign government whose interests are

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involved.

(8) This guidance does not apply to any liaison relationship that is concerned with U.S. internal functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters that are not directly related to foreign intelligence.

B. Definitions:

(1) Foreign intelligence -- the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations, and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.

(2) Sensitive source -- a person, organization, or technical means which provides intelligence, and which is vulnerable to counteraction and thus could be lost or diminished in effectiveness if its identity is compromised. A sensitive source is also a person or organization which provides intelligence, subject to agreement to protect its identity and intelligence relationship.

(3) Sensitive method -- the means by which support is provided to sensitive sources or the means by which intelligence is received from sensitive sources, when such means are vulnerable to counteraction or to loss of essential privacy if they are compromised.

(4) Conventional source -- a person, organization, or technical means which provides intelligence in an overt manner without condition of confidentiality or risk of counteraction.

(5) Conventional method -- overt means of supporting intelligence activities or obtaining intelligence information which are both lawful and accepted in the areas where they are used.

C. General requirements. The marking requirements for all classified intelligence information are covered in this guide. However, attention is invited to the currently authorized additional warning notices and their use, as contained in OPNAVINST 5510.1H. They are listed below with the abbreviations, as given in parentheses, which are to be used in paragraph markings and messages.

(1) Warning notice: Intelligence sources or methods involved (WNINTEL) (WN).

(2) Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator (ORCON) (OC).

(3) Caution: Proprietary information involved (PROPIN) (PR).

(4) Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants (No Contract) (NC).

(5) Not releasable to foreign nationals (NOFORN) (NF).

(6) This information has been authorized for release to (REL Specified Countries) (REL).

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